POLITICKÉ VEDY / POLITICAL SCIENCES

Časopis pre politológiu, najnovšie dejiny, medzinárodné vzťahy, bezpečnostné štúdiá / Journal for Political Sciences, Modern History, International Relations, security studies

Recommended form for quotation of the article / Odporúčaná forma citácie článku:

THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM OF THE FRAGILE STATE AS A TOOL FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION

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ABSTRACT

Stabilization and Reconstruction was used as a tool primarily aimed at alleviating complex problems in fragile states during and after the crisis. This concept was a part of a comprehensive and integrated approach to crisis management by the international community and, when possible, it was managed by the host nation. The study has further developed the practical experience of the authors from their deployment in international crisis management operations. Hence, the study proposed the criteria for the success of the security sector reform as a part of wider efforts of Stabilization and Reconstruction of a fragile state. The potential of the concept of security sector reform as a tool of the international community for the prevention and resolution of emerging intrastate conflicts, was semantically and factually investigated. The results of the study point out nine conditions for a long-term sustainable peace ensured by security sector reform, eight principles of successful security sector reform and seven axioms of success of the "western-style" security sector reform concept. Those conditions, principles and axioms should be used as a guidance for achievement such a security state of the conflict-affected society, when the host nation security sector is able to provide such environment in the state that allows the host nation government to implement progressive economic and social development.

Key words: security, stabilization and reconstruction, security sector reform, fragile state, stability.

Introduction

International efforts to re-establish and maintain peace in conflict regions are becoming the dominant instrument for resolving modern conflicts (Kompan,

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2019a). The origin and expansion of efforts to stabilize crisis regions is based mainly on the need to maintain peace after the end of World War II, when politicians, soldiers, but also the general population had fresh knowledge about the catastrophic consequences of this global conflict. The current approach to conflict resolution, based on early intervention, especially in the form of passing out violence, a more permanent presence of stabilizing forces in the post-conflict area, but also supporting the socio-economic development of conflict-affected communities, contributes to long-term to sustainable security (Waisová, 2008). The stability of a state or region is also important from the point of view of the stability of the current international system, because the growth of weak or falling states and other non-state actors is also considered among the factors of its current change (Varecha, 2019).

In view of the above, the concept of *Stabilization and Reconstruction* (S&R) is *used as a tool primarily aimed at alleviating complex problems in fragile states during and after the crisis.* The S&R concept is part of a comprehensive and integrated approach to crisis management by the international community and, where possible, should be managed by the host nation (HN). The main objective of S&R is to *maintain, promote or restore stability* in order to create the conditions for long-term sustainable peace, thereby restoring diplomatic, economic, cultural and social relations between the parties to the conflict, building communication channels and long-term peace cooperation (Kazanský – Ivančík, 2015). This directly calls for this process to be led by civilian agencies under normal circumstances and, ideally, to be legitimized by local authorities. Thereby, due to the instability of the environment in which S&R is executed, military support is also required to ensure the security of individual civilian agencies or even to take over the process until the secured deployment of civilian agencies is possible.

Stabilization is an approach that aims to mitigate the effects of the crisis, support legitimate political authorities and create the conditions for long-term stability and peace. Stabilization requires the comprehensive deployment of both civilian and military capabilities in order to reduce acts of violence, restore security and resolve social, economic and political disagreements and disputes. Along with stabilization, *reconstruction* should be carried out, aimed at rebuilding the physical infrastructure and government institutions that have been adversely affected by the consequences of the crisis. In any case, all activities should be aimed at influencing the primary sources of instability, i.e., those that are the reasons of the crisis and their elimination will create the conditions for long-term sustainable stability. However, the process itself should necessarily be

synchronized, because only by interconnecting the impacts of civilian and military structures, it is possible to achieve synergies in achieving the projected outcome.

This concept could be used in all conflicts and even more it is clearly more and more important due to the change in the current and projected development of the security environment in the 21ˢᵗ century (Brezula, 2018), when irregular threats are still actual (Spilý, 2013) like terrorism and vigilantism (Ivančík – Ušiak, 2014), Islamic radicalism (Kosárová – Ušiak, 2017) or Islamic extremism (Čech, 2019) and all of those rampant usually in fragile states. So, the intrastate conflicts, characterized by asymmetry and a wide range of irregular activities are more probable. These are increasingly emerging as a result of globalization, which in some cases is a source of national, religious or cultural clashes but also results from inefficient government and a security environment conducive to destabilizing actors and their destabilizing efforts (Hrnčiar, 2017). The activities of such actors make it difficult to implement S&R and undermine the international community's efforts to maintain stability. Destabilizing actors have the greatest influence until HN itself is able to ensure its own internal and external security. Therefore, the international community should always strive to restore the local security sector, through *Security Sector Reform* (SSR), so that HN itself provides the required level of security to the local population and thus confirms its own viability and additionally its legitimacy.

The SSR should be implemented as an integral part of the wider political reform, because the symptom of the political instability of the state is the internal conflict. The success of the SSR depends on the success of other peacekeeping activities, such as the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of members of the former security forces, if they were in opposition to the legitimate government. Of course, the whole SSR is a gradual process and HN's responsibility for its own security is not the result of an immediate change, but a gradual increase in the capabilities of the security sector supported by international actors. The SSR must be aimed at the rebuild or transformation of all HN security institutions, i.e. all actors, including their capabilities, responsibilities and activities. It needs to be implemented effectively, legitimately and transparently. By following these rules legitimate executive will be promoted and trust to local security actors will be restored. The SSR thus becomes a cornerstone of state-building projects after the internal conflict, which allows for further peace-building efforts, the so-called "Peacebuilding" (UN DPKO 2008) and further development of the state.

The influence of the international community by SSR on peace-building and the development of sustainable democratic self-government in HN is the subject of research of presented study. *The aim of the study* is to point out, based on the semantical and factual analysis, the *potential of the concept of SSR* as a tool of the international community *for the prevention and resolution of emerging internal conflicts. The main contribution of the study* is *the list of conditions, principles and axiom of successful SSR concept* which is necessary part of a broader comprehensive and integrated approach of the international community to crisis resolution. It presents the mutual relations, correlation and interference of necessary subjects integrated into the common SSR effort. The projected end state of this effort is to achieve such a security state of the conflict-affected society, when the security sector of the HN will be able to secure such a security environment in the state that will allow the HN government to implement progressive economic and social development.

In view of the above, the research question of the study is: *"Which are the criteria for the success of the security sector reform of a fragile state?"*

The study stems from the results of theoretical research and analysis by the authors. It is based on knowledge from domestic and foreign scientific and professional publications, articles, studies, qualifications, including terminological dictionaries thematically focused on the stabilization of the fragile state. Last but not least, the study implies the practical experience of the authors from their deployment in international crisis management operations.

1. A fragile state as an object of the SSR

The security environment is seen as an environment that is constantly changing, globalizing, becoming increasingly complex and prone to unpredictable change (Kompan, 2019b). The approach to the assessment of the security environment is an extremely sophisticated activity, due to its complexity, the dynamics of its changes, instability and the intertwining of the influences of individual actors (Bučka – Pástor, 2019; Mušinka, 2020).

The development of international security has a growing impact on the lives of the citizens of NATO countries, as well as other countries. Adversaries emerge, evolve and vary from traditional states to transnational entities such as non-state actors (Procházka et al., 2018), terrorist organizations, criminal networks, paramilitary organizations, which seek to use a broad portfolio of capabilities and methods to threaten state, regional and even global stability (Kompan, 2018).

Peace, security and their development are increasingly interconnected. This brings a clear requirement for close cooperation and coordination between international organizations (IO), which take a crucial and responsible role in preventing but also managing crises, i.e. in case of *hard loss of stability* (Belan – Uchaľ, 2018). In addition, the Alliance's unique capabilities of purpose-built modular forces (Dubec et al., 2012) will continue to be in demand to reduce human suffering through humanitarian and disaster relief operations. States, nations, transnational actors and non-state actors will contest and redefine the global division of power, the concept of sovereignty and the nature of the conflict.

Given the current strategic environment, we assume that the emergence of future conflicts will be dominated by internal causes within the state (TRADOC, 2012) and the occurrence of war conflicts between states is less likely, although not excluded (Stojar et al. 2018). Therefore, it is necessary to prepare its own defence mechanisms for each state so that it can resist sophisticated adversaries with complex capabilities (including irregular ones) and specific goals (Majchút, 2018). However, this requirement is very difficult to implement precisely in post-conflict fragile states that have been affected by national conflicts (DAC INCAF, 2007). The international community is therefore trying to respond immediately to the internal conflict, because even a limited local conflict without a timely solution could cause instability in a wider security environment (Hofreiter – Šimko, 2007). For example, the UN is responding by developing the concept of a new generation of multidimensional peace operations (UN Handbook 2003). Such operations are executed in potentially dangerous conditions of a internal conflict and require the deployment of international military, police and civilian capabilities in support of a comprehensive peace agreement. Another example is NATO's concept of Crisis Response Operations, in addition to military Collective Defence Operations under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Those operations are based on two main bearings. The first is Peace Support, designed to eliminate natural disasters, humanitarian operations, etc., or to support non-governmental, regional and IOs (Kazanský, 2013). The second is Security enhancement, i.e. Counter irregular activities or *Military contribution to stabilization and reconstruction* and others.

However, the basic imperative is that such operations should be carried out at the request of national authorities and their aim is to support the transition to legitimate government. In the initial phase, the legislative and administrative functions of the state are temporarily secured by the international community in order to ensure the transfer of authority from one legitimate sovereign national

entity to another, or when sovereignty needs to be fully resolved (temporary administration), or when HN has to build up administrative elements that did not previously exist.

Only a *stable state* could withstand potential crises. The key elements of a stable state (see Figure 1) and their functions, norms, and interrelationships enable the state to withstand instability.

Figure 1: Elements of a stable state

Source: Authors

In a broader context, it could be stated that any disruption of the homogeneity of the interaction of the elements of state stability is the primary precondition for the emergence of conflict. At the same time, the degradation of any of the elements will also lead to the erosion of the other elements. For example, weak government, the economic crisis and low level of security stimulate the development of a conflict that disrupts political establishment and thus erodes key social relations. The *main elements of state instability* (see Figure 2) include *security breaches, economic collapse, social disintegration* and *the dysfunction of state institutions*. In addition to internal influences, external stability is affected by external influences, in particular impaired regional security, limited international trade or the global economic crisis.

Figure 2: Sources of state instability.

Source: Authors

Due to the current development of the security environment, the disruption of the stability of the state is mostly a gradual development. The simplified framework of the *fragility phases of a fragile state* is as follows:

1. *Vulnerable* - a state is not able or willing to provide basic services to a significant part of citizens. Such states are characterized by limited state capacity and legitimacy, which does not provide citizens with protection against internal and external negative influences and crises. Such crises can be caused by opposition movements from within the state or from neighbouring states.
2. *Falling* - the state's ability to govern and protect citizens is severely degraded. It is a transient condition that can be reversed or increased to a higher degree based on the reaction and the nature of the instability.
3. *Fallen* - the state has inefficient and illegitimate government and limited sovereignty and control over its own territory. Public services are not provided, economic indicators are declining significantly and there are significant population movements. The armed forces are not able to respond adequately to external and internal aggressors.
4. *Post-crisis* – a state in the process of implementing a new political establishment that seeks to respond to the sources of instability that are the cause of the crisis or conflict. This phase is characterized by limited

government legitimacy, damaged infrastructure, limited public service delivery, but also by increasing levels of security and improving legislation.

5. *Recovering* – a state that is returning to stability, but still with some unsatisfactorily resolved sources of instability. Such a state is able, with a growing tendency, to guarantee security and government in its territory. The key measurable indicator is the state of public opinion, which should clearly confirm the acceptance and legitimacy of government and the normalization of relations in society.

Very similar categorization, indicating a specific state or phase of the state of the state, has been used in scientific and professional public (Šmíd – Vaďura, 2009). The individual phases rarely have clearly defined boundaries or transitions between them, and usually overlap. In any case, with a correct understanding of the current phase of state instability, it is possible to respond directly to specific sources of instability and thus reverse the crisis development to stability. *The premise is that the more unstable the state, the more likely it is that international efforts will be needed to restore stability.*

The international community strives to maintain the stability of states so that they are not a source of instability for other states. Therefore, activity at all levels is mainly focused on conflict prevention. Conflict prevention includes pre-conflict activities aimed at identifying situations that could lead to violent conflict. At the same time, it aims to reduce manifestations, prevent escalation and eliminate the cause of contradictions (Hofreiter, 2008). Conflict prevention means implementing a strategy, policy and measures to prevent the emergence or recurrence of an older conflict. Tools applicable in conflict prevention could be categorized as follows: *official diplomacy, unofficial diplomacy, economics and social relations, politics, rule of law, media, education, armed forces development – including SSR efforts* (Waisová, 2005).

Conflict prevention as a part of the S&R of an unstable state requires an active approach from a wide range of actors with different experience, resources, mandates and capabilities (Kompan, 2019a). *The military contribution is only a complementary contribution* that supports other actors within the international community (Spilý – Hrnčiar, 2013). In the SSR, military and police capabilities are a highly "sought-after" item that perfectly meets the requirements of the HN in the initial phase of the reform. Of course, one of the requirements of efforts, especially in COIN operations, will be to build-up trust (applying the "Minds and Hearts"

approach) (Turaj, 2018), strengthening mutual relations through cooperation, joint action and coordination so that HN's expectations are met. Additionally, diplomacy will contribute to securing the interests of its state abroad on the one hand and protecting its citizens on the other (Nečas – Andrassy, 2018).

2. "Western-style" SSR

The S&R of a fragile state requires cooperation in security initiatives so that the level of stability achieved is sustainable and increases in the future. One of the components of S&R is also SSR, which is focused on building HN security capacities. The main goal of the SSR is to reform legitimate government security institutions, which have key role in ensuring the external and internal security of HN. This means that it is mainly focused on the reform of the "power" ministries, namely defence, interior and justice, but also on training, development and support for the HN forces.

In the case of SSR, it is necessary to perceive that it is not focuses only on the development of "uniformed" personnel, but also civilian personnel to ensure the comprehensive security of the HN population at the national, regional and local levels. This means that the SSR ensures the development of state security forces, government security management offices, civil security structures, including non-state security, legislative and judicial actors. The intention of the SSR is therefore to reform all components of the security sector, which consists of individuals and institutions that provide security and justice for the citizens of the state.

The implementation of a comprehensive well-thought-out SSR must include the following *elements of the security sector*:

- *State security forces* - military forces, police forces, gendarmerie, intelligence services (military and civilian), coast guard, border guard, customs guard, but also active reserves of military forces (e.g., national guard and militia) and local civil security services.
- *Institutions managing and supervising state security* - executive and advisory bodies of national security, legislative commissions, ministries of defence, interior and international affairs customs administration, financial institutions (Ministry of Finance, budgetary authorities, financial administration, audit and planning bodies) and civil society organizations and traditional national authorities.

- *Justice* - the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary, the prison system, criminal investigative units, human rights commissions and ombudsmen, but also traditional local and regional judicial authorities (tribal courts).
- *Non-State Security Forces* - Liberation armies, paramilitary forces, private security services, and political party militias.

It is critical to respond flexibly to the need to reform all elements of the security sector, in a comprehensive SSR, so that a *suitable supporter of the reform provides support to a suitable recipient.* This means that military forces are a suitable supporter of the reform of the HN forces, but their ability to provide support to police forces is limited (Kompan, 2019a).

Assistance in the development of security capacities always benefits from its overall coordination with other development projects within HN. Therefore, the SSR must be coordinated with other national or international actors so that security programs are in synergy with the development of other state functions and at the same time also supported by diplomatic tools and resources that enable and develop HN government capabilities in ensuring effective, legitimate and responsible security for the population of the state. SSR is therefore a comprehensive set of development programs and activities aimed at increasing the level of security and justice provided by HN. SSR programs require the integration of activities in almost all public sectors, focusing in particular on defence, justice, intelligence and legitimate government. The success could be achieved only through a comprehensive approach to all these sectors in the SSR. Thus, the SSR is the recovery and transformation of state security institutions, involving all relevant actors, including their roles, responsibilities and activities, that is managed and executed effectively, legitimately and responsibly in accordance with the principles of "good" governance.

The SSR plan and program should be an integral part of the overall strategic reform of HN and, ideally, HN should be developed *with the support of all relevant supporting national* (Sedra, 2014) and *international actors* (e.g., peacekeepers, IOs, NGOs, etc.). The main political objective of the SSR is to ensure that security within the state is ensured in accordance with internationally accepted standards, respect for human rights and in accordance with international legislation. It is essential that the SSR takes full account of the national specifics of HN and is primarily managed and guided by domestic state or non-state institutions with regard to the trust and attitude of the population towards security institutions (historically and with regard to the current conflict). Therefore, it is essential that

the SSR should be continuously coordinated and no divergences from the set HN programs could not be allowed because they could discredit entire reform. This coordination should start immediately at the time of the initial evaluation of the HN security sector and continue during the planning, implementation, monitoring phase and it is would be completed by the final evaluation phase. The following four *primary objectives of the SSR* intersect in all phases:

- *Increase the capacity* for effective management, oversight and accountability of the state security sector.
- *Improve the availability* and delivery of security and justice.
- *Assist local authorities* in implementing the reform process.
- *Support the development* of a sustainable level of security and justice.

This means that the SSR should primarily ensure the development of a constitutional and legal framework that will allow HN to use force in accordance with international standards so as to respect human rights and universally recognized standards within the international community. At the same time, it is necessary to reform the governing and supervising institutions of HN, so that it is not possible to discredit the reform, or to misuse it.

The success of the SSR and the achievement of these primary objectives will depend on a comprehensive and coordinated approach based on the following *principles*:

1. *Sustainability* - the management and planning system of the SSR must be sustainable in the long term with regard to the capacities and capabilities of HN and must be integrated within the development of other government sectors.
2. *Support for HN in the management of SSR* - the principles, rules, laws and structures that provide the framework of SSR must respect the national specifics of HN (history, culture, religion, legal system, etc.), which will ensure the legitimacy and transparency of reform in the eyes of HN population. This means that there is no universal model of SSR, but it will always vary based on the national specifics of a particular state.
3. *Application of the principles of "good" governance and respect for human rights* - the SSR must include a system of accountability and control mechanisms to prevent abuse of power and corruption, as well as a mechanism that supports the building of public confidence in the security sector of the state.

4. *Linking security to justice* - the SSR should ensure the reform of the security forces so that they operate in accordance with national and international legislation and are fully within the comprehensive framework of law enforcement.
5. *Public trust and credibility* - while supporting the reconstruction of the institutions of a fallen state, it is necessary to restore the population's confidence in the security forces. Growing trust and increasing positive public opinion confirm the legitimacy of the security forces, and thus confidence in the security operations of the security forces.
6. *Capacity building of local leaders* - ensuring the development of management structures, including new leaders at all levels of the security sector, is also a challenge in the development of competent, legitimate and responsible security forces. This will ensure the long-term stability and sustainability of SSR by HN's own forces.
7. *Independence of HN* - it is necessary to eliminate the dependence of the HN security sector on SSR providers, especially by early training of the security forces and achieving their full operational capabilities in the shortest possible time.
8. *Balancing operational support with institutional reform* - to ensure a coherent approach and unity of effort, initiatives, processes, reforms, resources and capabilities need to be sustainable beyond the end of SSR support.

Adherence to all above mentioned principles, and in particular the maintenance of HN independence and the balance of support and reform, requires in most cases the greatest extend of the effort and also it requires a correct understanding of the SSR and its importance for conflict prevention. Properly conceptually implemented SSR is a relevant factor that acts preventively against the emergence or reopening of conflict, helps in peace-building and development of HN. The SSR therefore requires a proper understanding of the dynamics of security, conflict prevention, peace-building, development, "good governance", human rights, civil society, state-building and democracy in the context of HN needs, but also to meet the international community's expectations for long-term sustainability, political, economic and social development of HN. The concept of SSR is therefore very complex, requiring eminent efforts from relevant actors and a proper understanding by political elites and decision-makers. The SSR requires the deployment of many capabilities, including military

capabilities, but their deployment must be based on the requirement of the comprehensive and thoughtful development of the HN security sector.

The contribution of military capabilities to the implementation of the SSR focuses on improving security through cooperation with relevant partners within the HN security sector. When deploying military forces, it is also necessary to understand the relationship and difference between military capabilities and HN law enforcement capabilities. In the context of the conflict, there may have been erosion or complete extinction of individual components of power and thus unhealthy processes in society. It is therefore necessary to restore the separation of military forces from the police forces and to set up a control mechanism to maintain this separation.

Under the SSR, the focus is divided into 3 particular areas: Security Force Assistance (SFA), Stability Policing (SP) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Activities and tasks during SSR

Source: Authors

SFA is a key element of the HN defence reform, which is aimed at implementing development activities and supporting the sustainable capabilities of local armed forces and their associated institutions. SFA serves to develop

responsible, sustainable, competent and credible security forces that are able to meet the security challenges of HN.

SP is focused on the development of the local police so that they are able to take over their standard tasks from the IO, which perform its tasks in the initial phase of the SSR. The SP forms a portfolio of police-focused activities that influence the strengthening and, if necessary, temporary replacement of the local police in order to restore, maintain and enforce law and order, security, justice and human rights. Therefore, SP must be carried out by specialized forces (trained and equipped police forces) that are able to maintain public order and security and enforce the law in accordance with internationally applicable standards.

DDR involve three separated but very closely interlinked activities (Dyck, 2016). Disarmament is aimed at collecting, recording, controlling and disposing of small arms, ammunition and heavy weapons from the conflict that belonged to military groups, insurgents and the local population. Disarmament also includes the development of government programs to reduce armaments. Demobilization is a process of transition from a conflicted military establishment and a war-oriented economy to a peaceful establishment, and we consider it essential to maintain national security and economic viability. In the context of the DDR, demobilization is the formal and controlled release of members of armed groups. Demobilization must be approached very carefully so that it is not a source of continuation or exacerbation of a new conflict. Reintegration is the process by which elements of a conflict-stricken society receive amnesty, re-enter civil society, perform long-term sustainable employment and become members of civil society again. Reintegration is thus a process of reconstruction focused on the social and economic areas of the local community, educational programs for former members of the armed forces and their settlement or resettlement within local communities.

When planning the SSR, it is necessary to define in advance the conditions, when the responsibilities for security will be transferred from the intervening international forces to the security forces of the HN. The transfer of authority is a process based on the condition that the HN security forces have achieved sustainable development, operational readiness at the local, regional and national levels, and this development has been confirmed by an independent evaluation. This will ensure that the results of the SSR are not annihilated by handing over responsibility for HN security to incompetent and unprepared security forces, which could lead to a loss of civilian confidence and allow

opposition conflict groups to flourish. Following the transfer of HN authority and the stabilization of the security environment, other prosperous agencies, institutions and organizations have more freedom of action and could carry out their activities relatively safely, which will ensure the rapid development of HN.

In particular, the security forces assistance requires the deployment of experienced individuals (Ullrich et al., 2019) assisting the domestic armed forces to reach the level required by national authorities. This requirement cannot be met only by the transformation of the doctrinal environment, but also requires the systematic training of key individuals and its supervision. Changes in the security environment, which are characterized by dynamics, instability, complexity and interconnectedness of individual trends, also require changes in approaches and principles applied in the preparation, education and view of competencies that are necessary in this security environment (Ullrich et al., 2018). At the same time, the need to understand the local specifics of the state (Hrnčiar, 2018) comes to the fore so that conflict situations resulting from insufficient respect for the domestic population do not occur.

Conclusion

None of the major international peacekeeping operations has reached the desired political objective, yet (Dopita, 2011). The state transition to a stable, independent and prosperous liberal democracy with fully reformed and credible security forces is complex activity with almost unpredictable results and uncertain outcomes.

One such example is Afghanistan, which has been facing conflicts for decades. At the regional level, insurgent networks (Taliban, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State or the Haqqani Network) were the main security actors instead of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. These security actors constantly sought out and exploited the weaknesses of the Afghan National Security Forces. Although the Afghan National Security Forces have been largely supported by the international community over the past two decades, their transformation into an independent, well-trained, motivated and equipped security force has been only partially successful.

Another example is Iraq, as an extremely war-torn state, where multiple concepts concerning SSR were executed, but after more than 15-years of effort, none of those was successful, yet.

However, based on international experience from "western-style" SSR we could claim that *for optimal support and effective SSR, it is therefore appropriate that the following axioms are to be followed*:

1. *SSR is one way to achieve the overall success* - it is not the only way and must be carried out in full synchronization with other efforts.
2. *SSR develops the HN security sector* - not to focus on developing the capabilities of SFA objects, which will not develop the entire HN security sector, but only military forces.
3. *The SSR object may fail* - therefore it is necessary to set the right indicators that can identify negative impacts in time.
4. *The SSR object should be visible* - especially with regard to the interaction with the local population, which should perceive the SSR as a promotion of the security. Therefore, it is better for the HN to do something "good enough" than for the international community to do it perfectly.
5. *Requirements and tasks from the HN have priority* - because security "belongs" to the HN, and only HN has the right to enforce it with their own directives.
6. *Understand the cultural specifics of a particular area* - understand that SSR is performed in a fragile state and cultural differences cannot divide or bring about conflicts.
7. *SSR must be a constantly flexible response effort* - responsive to the needs of HN and the development of the HN security environment.

Based on the above facts, it is therefore *necessary to meet the following conditions in the implementation of the SSR in order to achieve the overall success of the SSR and thus ensure a long-term sustainable peace*:

1. *Responsibility of HN* for the creation, implementation and evaluation of programs within the SSR.
2. *Understanding and promoting the national specifics of HN*, in the context of its history, culture and legal system.
3. *Consensus of actors* and equal support to all citizens of the state, regardless of their ethnic or religion, which will ensure the prevention of elitism and rivalry.
4. *Gradually increasing security*, which is a precondition for fulfilling other tasks within the SSR.

5. *Development and renewal* of national institutional capacities of HN instead of parallel security structures built by the international community.
6. *Coordination of support providers* within a common coherent strategy of all internal and external actors.
7. *Training trends adaptation* (Kozáková – Polach, 2018), centralization of the preparation as a separate functional area intervening in other processes (Zahradníček, 2018).
8. When applying SSR, *implement such methods that will be not only acceptable but also successful* (Zahradníček – Rak, 2020).
9. *Long-term sustainable perspective* and resource security, not just the concept of responding to current security threats.

It follows from the previous parts of the study that by promoting a continuous and consistent evaluation of the above criteria for success in the implementation of the SSR, the overall success of the SSR could be achieved, thus stability, consistent and long-term sustainable peace in a fragile state could be promoted.

From the experience of international forces, it must be stated that success is a process that requires a long-term, if not permanent, commitment of international forces and institutions providing a wide range of mentoring, education, training, logistics and other support activities and initiatives. It can be assumed that the prematurely or abruptly terminated SSR process will not meet the desired goal, which may lead to the failure of the entire S&R concept.

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