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THE LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE FOR DEFENCE 2030 - COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS¹

Josef Procházka, Antonín Novotný, Richard Stojar, Libor Frank*

ABSTRACT

This paper provides a comparative analysis and qualitative assessment of the Czech document called "The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030". It outlines a set of criteria and provides a matrix for the measurement to place these documents into boundaries of hierarchy and typology of mission, vision, strategy, conception and plan. It compares the document with 11 other foreign documents. This research sample was analysed in two areas: 1) the purpose and nature of the documents, and 2) the contents of the documents. The Czech document differs from the set of analysed documents in its nature - purpose as well as contents. Its title expresses the ambition to streamline the development of building the system of national defence and the contents cover primarily the development of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. It has a broader nature and according to the selected method of evaluation, it is rather a strategy. The degree of detail in its individual sections differs significantly. The obtained results of comparative analysis reflect different national approaches to preparing strategic documents in the purpose, concept, contents and place in the hierarchy of strategic documents. At the end, the paper outlines several recommendations and suggestions for the document's amendment, to be prepared as "The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2035".

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Key words:

mission, vision, strategy, concept, plan, defence policy, defence policy

adaptation

Introduction

"The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030" represents the framework for fulfilling the political and military ambitions of the Czech Republic. It serves as a guideline for defence planning, particularly in developing five-year medium term plans. Based on an analysis of trends in the strategic environment, it outlines the basic direction for the development of military capabilities and provides guidance for the "Concept of the Czech Armed Forces Development 2025" and other conceptual documents. The Long Term Perspective stems from the legal system and the strategic policy documents of the Czech Republic, and takes into account the principles of NATO and EU security policies and military documents (MoD. The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030, p. 4).

The aim of this paper is to describe the process of preparation of the security strategy and policy documents in the case of The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030² along with a partial comparative analysis with similar documents of selected partner states in NATO and the EU. The process of preparation of the Long Term Perspective started already in 2013 and the aim of the document was to achieve gradually the political-military ambitions of the Czech Republic over the timeline until 2030. The Long Term Perspective material was supposed to become one of the major documents of strategic management in the defence department, building on the Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic from 2012. Besides other influences, it should take into account, in particular, the new trends in the development of the security environment, which are likely to have an impact on the defence of the Czech Republic. At the same time, the perspective was the starting point for the conceptual documents at lower level, such as the Concept of Building of the Army of the Czech Republic. It was a crucial document for the direction of the Czech Armed Forces and the development of their military capabilities. At the same time, it also represented the guidelines for defence planning and for the creation of five-year term plans.

With regard to the document itself, the Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030, discussed and approved by the Government of the Czech Republic in June 2015, is described in its introduction as a framework for the Concept of

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² In the text uses also in the short version as "the Long Term Perspective" in the same meaning.

Building of the Army of the Czech Republic. At the same time, it is introduced as a document that respects the strategic documents of the Czech Republic -Security Strategy of the Czech Republic and Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic. In addition, it takes into account the strategic documents of NATO and the EU and in its conclusion it is explicitly subordinated to the *Defence Strategy* of the Czech Republic in the sense that were the political-military ambitions of the Czech Republic become modified, the Long Term Perspective will be amended accordingly. Under the influence of several factors, there are currently two forms of these amendments under way. In March 2017, the Government of the CR discussed and approved the new Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic. It reflects the needs to react to the changes in the qualities of the security environment, which have occurred especially since 2014 and which could have a significant impact on providing the defence of the Czech Republic and her Allies (Procházka, Karaffa, Frank 2015, Dyčka, Procházka 2017). The character of the new security environment reflects the fact that after a relatively long period of stability, the ongoing dynamic changes and trends that affect the aspects of social and international relations now present more risk and are more complicated than in the previous two decades. The security environment is developing, has become more complex and includes a number of dimensions, which may not have been taken into account until a few years ago and which generate growing instability and insecurity nowadays. The range and diversity of these threats is growing and it is now harder to define, for instance, clear boundaries of military aggression and to evaluate the required responses on this basis, including the use of military force or civilian instruments in order to pursue effective solutions instead of being faced with unexpected chaotic and uncontrolled consequences of these reactions (Frank, 2015, Stojar et al. 2018).

One of the ambitions of this paper is to provide general assessment of the contents and the importance of *the Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030* document from 2015 and possibly, in accordance with the conclusion of the document (*prospective revision should take place in four years;* MoD, The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030, p. 19), to suggest its modifications and amendments with regard to the analysis of selected documents with similar function.

1 The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030

The structure of the document consisting of five chapters mainly covers the predicted security and operating environment and the possible form of participation in future operations. Further, it also mentions the implications for the development of military capabilities and the preconditions for achieving the necessary military capabilities. *The Long Term Perspective* confirmed the politico-military ambitions, applicable at that time, at the level defined by the *Defence Strategy of 2012*. Unlike in previous years, there was no risk of reducing the quantitative level of ambition, because adequate financial resources have been already allocated.

Although the framework of security environment was and is primarily defined by the *Security Strategy of the Czech Republic*, based on the specificity of the Department of Defence, *the Long Term Perspective* also includes a list of trends with a major impact on the defence of the state and its allies. Based on the analysis of these trends in the strategic environment, *the Long Term Perspective* defines the basic direction for the development of military capabilities and the framework for the *Concept of Building of the Army*, which elaborates it further into specific military procedures and solutions to meet the identified ambitions of the CR. The future operating environment is characterized by this document as follows:

The nature of the future security environment will require:

- rapid force projection, including strategic distances;
- ability to conduct major military operations at the corps level;
- flexibility, enhanced force readiness and mobility;
- international cooperation, particularly greater NATO and EU responsiveness;
- comprehensive approach the capability of all military branches and services to conduct joint operations, as well as combined operations with the involvement of intelligence, military and civilian elements, both in the traditional battlefield and the cyberspace and media environment (MoD. The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030, p. 7).

The broad range of threats was and is a considerable challenge for the Czech Armed Forces, involving the need to respond to all threats while maintaining the principle of one set of forces. The nature of the security environment also requires the ability to respond to the strategic distance and execute operations at the level of higher-level units and groupings. The basic

principle for building the Armed Forces should consist in maintaining balanced capabilities with the possibility of completing the building of required capacities in the event of a further deterioration of the security environment. This should be reflected also in the peacetime structure by creating the conditions for the creation of the division level of command before establishing the wartime structure. This was related to the development of the technological potential as well as the wider use of the institute of active reserves. For the further development of the armed forces, principles of the qualitative dimension of the political-military ambitions are introduced, such as the principle of the modularity of forces, without which the modern conflicts cannot be even imagined.


Part of the Long Term Perspective material is dedicated to the specific directions of the development of the Armed Forces. The development of military intelligence occupies an important place and its strengthening is a vital reaction to the ever-shorter warning time. With regard to the best possible elimination of this threat, the document states that it is necessary to develop the system of strategic warning and response to the risks and crises in connection with NATO and the EU. The Long Term Perspective also responds to the area of cyber defence of the information, intelligence and C2 systems.

In terms of defence spending, the document requires the value of 1.4% GDP, introduced in the joint statement of the political parties from September 2014 (Czech Government. Agreement, 2014). However, the document also says that:

"The optimal amount of defence spending, enabling timely fulfilment of the political-military ambitions and commitments of the Czech Republic, is the level corresponding to 2% of GDP, which is also set out in the NATO political directive and confirmed at the NATO summit in Wales in 2014 by the highest representatives of the member states, including the Czech Republic." (MoD. The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030, p. 16)

The position of this document in the system of the Czech strategic documents is shown in Figure 1.

Table 1: Long Term Perspective for Defence in the System of the Czech Strategic Documents



Source: Authors

2 Comparison of the Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030 Document with Foreign Strategic Documents

In 2018, the Centre for Security and Military Strategic Studies of the University of Defence Brno made comparisons of this document with selected foreign strategic and conceptual materials with the following goals:

- 1. To collect and analyse the strategic and conceptual documents from selected states;
- To perform a comparative analysis of these documents and use it as a base for the assessment of the relevance of comparability with the Long Term Perspective;
- 3. To identify topics to update *the Long Term Perspective* related to its nature and contents.

The Centre prepared its own methodologies to perform the analysis and used the techniques of comparative analysis and strategic benchmarking. The study sample of strategic and conceptual documents from these 11 states was used for the comparative analysis:

- Belgium The Strategic Vision for Defence (2016);
- Denmark Danish Defence Agreement 2018-2023 (2018);
- France French White Paper on Defence and National Security (2013);
- Canada Canada's Defence Policy (2017);
- Netherlands In the Interest of the Netherlands (2018);
- Germany White Book on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (2016);
- Austria Military Strategic Concept (2017);
- Poland The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland (2017);
- Slovakia Proposal for a Long-term Defence Development Plan with an Emphasis on the Building and Development of the Slovak Armed Forces with a View to 2030 (2017);
- UK National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review (2015);
- US National Defence Strategy (2018).

The above introduced research sample was analysed in two areas: 1) the purpose and nature of the documents, and 2) the contents of the documents. The results of comparative analysis described in this paper reflect different national approaches to preparing strategic documents in the purpose, concept, contents and place in the hierarchy of strategic documents. Most states have no equivalent document to *the Long Term Perspective* or its contents and function are shared by multiple documents.

2.2 The Approach Used

The purpose and nature of the documents were evaluated using the following four categories:

- The level of complexity (whether the document includes all aspects of the national defence system or is limited to the Department of Defence and the Armed Forces).
- 2. The quality of the definition of the target condition (whether the document sets out clear objectives, and if so, whether they are in accordance with the SMART method).
- 3. Proactivity/reactivity (the focus of the document on the solution to the current problems or future needs).
- 4. The detail of elaboration of the objectives (whether the document, according to the set out objectives, has the nature of a plan, concept, strategy, or vision, i.e., more general or more specific nature).

The analysis of the contents of the document was performed using 11 "type areas" with binary evaluation (value of 1 if the area is present in the document; value of 0 if it is not addressed). The type areas are based on the structure of the Long Term Perspective and include:

- definition of threats;
- strategic bases;
- expected operations (use) of the armed forces;
- principles of building the armed forces;
- structure of the capabilities of the armed forces;
- requirements for the capabilities of the armed forces;
- financial resources,
- staff resources;
- material resources;
- defence industry;
- other components of the national defence system.

2.3 The Nature of the Documents

The results of the analysis of the purpose and nature of the documents are shown in Table 2. A total of six to seven documents are closer in their nature to the values of "proactive" and "specific" and having the character of "concept". On the contrary, only four documents - including the Long Term Perspective - can be described as "proactive" and "general" with the character of "strategy".

The remaining two documents (Belgium and Austria) cannot be assigned to any of the categories.

The following documents are the closest to the Long Term Perspective:

- French White Paper on Defence and National Security (France);
- White Book on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Germany);
- Canada's Defence Policy (Canada).

These three documents occupy the position close to the Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic in the hierarchy of strategic documents in the respective countries. Based on the comparison, it is seen as suitable to shift the position of the future document (Long Term Perspective for Defence 2035) to the areas of "proactive" and "specific", in combination with the nature of "concept", and to draw inspiration for preparing its contents from the following documents: Defence Agreement 2018-2023 (Denmark), In the Interest of the Netherlands, The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland, Proposal for a Long-term Defence Development Plan with an Emphasis on the Building and Development of the Slovak Armed Forces with a View to 2030, National Defence Strategy (US), and National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (UK).

If the future the Long Term Perspective for Defence 2035 should maintain the same nature as the existing one, the inspiration should be drawn from the White Paper on Defence and National Security (France), White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Germany), and Canada's Defence Policy, despite the fact that these are countries with a significantly different potential and ambitions than the CR. In this case, it is desirable to set out more precisely the purpose, contents and place of the Long Term Perspective in the hierarchy of strategic documents of the Czech Republic (the department development strategy with its contents close to the White Paper on Defence, developing in detail the Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic). The recommended position of the revised document of the Long Term Perspective for Defence 2035 is shown as a dotted line.

Table 2: Comparative Analysis of Documents from Selected Countries

Source: Authors

Horizontal axis

Generic - strategic level objectives, conceptualization, general commitments to resource allocation, missing implementation framework

Specific - two specific tasks or measures, transparent resources and sound implementation framework

Vertical axis

Proactive - long-term focus beyond the horizon, shaping environment Reactive - short-term focus reflecting presence or development in past

Level of complexity - diameter of circle



The diameter of the circle represents the level of complexity; focus on military instruments of national power

Quality of end state definition - colour of circle

Green colour

S2

means a well-defined end state.

Amber colour



means a rather generic definition of the end state.

Red colour



means a too generic definition of the end state (is not included in the table).

2.4 The Structure of the Documents

Typical structure of the documents is described in Table 3. All documents (100%) include sections dedicated to "defining threats", "strategic bases", "requirements for capabilities", and "structure of capabilities". Most of the documents contain the "principles for building the armed forces" (82%), "anticipated operations (use) of the armed forces" (64%), and to different degrees, depending on the type of the document, also "resources" (financial -100%, staff - 91%, material - 82%). The less often mentioned categories include "other components of the national defence system" (represented in 55% of documents) and "defence industry" (represented in 45% of documents).

Table 3: Structure of the Analysed Documents

Table 3. Off detaile of the Analysed Documents	
Definition of threats	100%
Strategic bases	100%
Capability requirements	100%
Capability structure	100%
Resources (financial/staff/material)	100% / 91% / 82%
Building principles	82%
Operations	64%
Other components of the national defence system	55%
Defence industry	45%

Source: Authors

It appears desirable to include the following chapters in the new Long Term Perspective for Defence 2035 document: the definition of threats, strategic bases, requirements for capabilities, structure of capabilities, and financial resources. The recommended topics are the principles for building, staff resources, material resources, and operations. Based on the comparison, it should be also considered whether it is appropriate to include the less frequent chapters, namely the other components of the national defence system and defence industry.

2.5 The Evaluation of the Security Environment

Special attention has been paid to the evaluation of the security environment - what threats are mentioned in the documents and which ones are absent, and where it was apparent, what is the trend that the country sees with respect to the threat, i.e., whether the threat increases or may increase or decrease in the given time frame).

The analysis allowed the assessment of differences in the perception of threats and the description of the transformation of the security environment over time (with regard to the different dates of issue of the documents). The assessment was largely influenced by the different nature of the documents. At the same time, many threats overlap and may not be clearly separated analytically - e.g., hybrid threats could be attributed by specific countries to the Russian Federation, non-state actors, cyber-attacks or misinformation, etc.

There is a significant difference in the attitude of the analysed documents, where some documents provide almost an exhaustive list of threats, whereas other mention only the most topical or increasing ones. It is also interesting to note the frequency of occurrence of threats in the documents (max. 11) compared to the threats most frequently seen as having increasing or decreasing importance. The results of the evaluation are summarised in Tables 4 and 5.

Table 4: Frequency of Occurrence of Threats

Threat	Number of countries
Instability outside Europe / North America	11
Terrorism, radicalisation	11
Cyber attacks	11

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Diversified distribution of power	9
Non-state actors	9
Illegal / massive migration	9
Conflicts for raw materials and resources	9
Proliferation of WMD and carriers	9
Weak states	8
Extremism, radicalism, fundamentalism	8
(International) organised crime	8
Climate change, natural disasters	8
RF intervention in the east, assertive policy of RF	7
Misinformation, propaganda	7
Possible use of WMD	7
Globalisation and increasing inequality	7

Source: Authors

Table 5: Threat Most Frequently Perceived as Growing

Threat	Number of countries
Diversified distribution of power	7
Cyber attacks	6
Non-state actors	5
Globalisation and increasing inequality	5
Climate changes	5
The increase in defence spending by new superpowers / outside Europe	4
Instability outside Europe / North America	4
Conflicts for raw materials and resources	4
Terrorism, radicalisation	4
RF intervention in the east, assertive policy of RF	4

Source: Authors

2.6 The Comparison of the Perception of the Security Environment with the 2030 Perspective

Based on the comparison of the perception of the security environment, it is apparent that the Long Term Perspective does not significantly differ from how the security environment is viewed in the studied countries and that it reflects the principal trends in the security environment adequately. However, it is possible to identify some of the increasing threats that are not reflected by the Long Term Perspective, unlike some of the foreign documents. These include, for example, the threat of aggression in the outer space (included in the documents of France, Germany, UK, Canada and US) or climate changes in the Arctic (Denmark, France, Canada, UK). The documents of France and Canada particularly emphasize the threat of attacks against their citizens abroad (e.g., kidnapping). It can be assumed that in the long term the relevance of these threats for the CR will also increase.

Majority of the documents have already explicitly addressed the Russian Federation as a threat, whether mentioning intervention in Ukraine or more generally its assertive policy or power ambitions. Some countries also perceive as a threat the unforeseeable developments in foreign and security policy of the RF. The shift in the perception of the security environment in this area is quite noticeable. While the documents issued by the end of 2014 speak of the decreasing threat of a conventional armed conflict, the documents issued after 2014 no longer contain such information. On the contrary, more than half of them newly points out the threat associated with Russia - its conventional forces or possible forms of hybrid and misinformation campaigns. This clearly demonstrates the transformation of perception of the security environment and the flexibility of response by the studied states in their strategic and conceptual documents.

A threat that the Long Term Perspective does not focus on is the use of weapons of mass destruction (especially tactical nuclear weapons) by the countries which have them available - i.e., not their possible proliferation to other actors. Some of the documents see as a threat not only cyber-attacks, but they also particularly define cyber espionage or cyber-crime as separate threats.

3 The Summary of the Comparative Analysis of Strategic Documents

The Long Term Perspective differs in its nature (purpose and contents) from the set of analysed documents. Its title expresses the ambition to streamline the development of building of the system of national defence and the contents cover primarily the development of the armed forces of the CR. The Long Term Perspective has a broader nature and according to the selected method of evaluation, it is more a strategy. The degree of detail of the Long Term Perspective in its individual parts differs significantly.

The concept of *the Long Term Perspective* is close to the White Paper on Defence and National Security (France), White Book on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (Germany) and Canada's Defence Policy. These documents occupy central positions in the hierarchy of strategic documents and they have the same nature (purpose) as the Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic.

The structure of the studied documents is largely similar. All of the documents contain security threats, strategic bases, capability requirements, capability structure, and financial resources (100%). Other areas are represented as follows: staff resources (91%), principles for building the armed forces (82%), material resources (82%), operations (64 %), other components of the national defence system (55%), and defence industry (45%).

If the Long Term Perspective is supposed to have the role in accordance with No. 66/2012,³ it is appropriate to shift its nature more into the "proactive" and "specific" areas, i.e., the "concept" nature (see Table 2). The following documents can be used as a model for its contents: Defence Agreement 2018-2023 (Denmark), In the Interest of the Netherlands, The Defence Concept of the Republic of Poland, Proposal for a Long-term Defence Development Plan with an Emphasis on the Building and Development of the Slovak Armed Forces with a View to 2030, National Defence Strategy (US), and National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (UK).

³ The Order of the Minister of Defence No. 66/2012, Planning the Activities and Development in the Ministry of Defence, published in the Official Journal of the MoD.

4 Possible Recommendations to Update the Long Term Perspective 2035 and Similar Strategic Documents

In view of the recent changes in the security environment and other factors, the authors of this paper see as desirable to incorporate the following recommendations for preparing the Long Term Perspective for Defence 2035:

- In the introduction of the document, describe its purpose and clearly define its position in the hierarchy of strategic documents (the documents it is based on and the documents that develop it further or evaluate it);
- When updating the Long Term Perspective, it is desirable to use the approved Methodological Guide for the Creation of Conceptual Documents (especially considering alternative views and possibilities of their verification) (Procházka 2018);
- The principal trends in the security environment are essentially in accordance with the perception of the security environment by other countries. It is recommended to consider the partial adjustments to highlight or specify certain already addressed threats and their trends (increasing or decreasing importance);
- Besides security threats, it is recommended to consider the opportunities for the development of capabilities (international cooperation, technological development). The demographic trends and their impact on the armed forces should not be neglected;
- More appropriately link the security threats with consequences for the defence and the use and development of the armed forces (tasks, operating environment and military implications);
- It is necessary to define the nature (purpose) of the document (whether it is related to the armed forces, defence department, or defence in its entirety) and its position in the hierarchy of strategic documents. It can be recommended to narrow it down to the concept of development within the ministry following up on the Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic addressing all areas of strategic management (creating the framework for defining the strategic objectives), define the political direction for the development of the armed forces and setting the aspects;
- It is necessary to update and expand the bases of the defence policy (especially include the results of the summits and development in

NATO and the EU (PESCO). Further, incorporate the reaction to the modified political-military ambitions, in the case of the Czech Republic, in particular, the requirement for enlarging the Army of the CR by 5 thousand soldiers (Defence Strategy of the Czech Republic. 2017. p. 6) and requirements arising from the *Capability Targets* 2017 - especially forming a heavy brigade by 2026;

- The key is to clarify the concept of the document, in the sense whether
 it reflects the holistic approach to the defence of the state and as
 such, it must address all capabilities (not only military) necessary for
 ensuring the defence or is related to the ministry of defence and
 armed forces;
- Prepare the document in terms of the Order of the Minister No. 66/2012, respecting that the document will serve as the strategy of the ministry, providing a conceptual basis for formulating strategic objectives of the I. and II. levels and directing the concept of development of capabilities of the Czech Armed Forces. It will be appropriate to adapt the name, structure and contents to the new approach.

Based on the concept of *the Long Term Perspective*, adding new or expanding existing sections should be considered:

- to elaborate the Long Term Perspective tasks in more detail (not to be limited to full range of operations only);
- to assess military implications in terms of use of the Long Term Perspective in the future operating environment;
- to include the principles for the building (the importance of timely response, availability of reserves and resources for the needs of the wartime deployment, etc.);
- to provide institutional adaptation of the Ministry of Defence.

Improve the overall graphical appearance and visualization of information in order to make the document more attractive for the public, similar to some other documents. In comparison with *the Long Term Perspective*, western European documents provide high-level visualization of the contents, which enhances clarity and attractiveness of the document for the general public. Especially the White Paper on Defence of the Netherlands can be taken as a model.

In view of the recent changes in the security environment, which have occurred since the publication of *the Long Term Perspective*, it appears desirable to incorporate the following recommendations:

- Keep the emphasis on shorter response times to crisis situations (in accordance with the Defence Strategy), but do not set out specific time intervals, as the response times differ depending on the operating domain and the instruments used - in the range of minutes to months;
- Take into account the fact that the increase in defence spending does not apply only to the Russian Federation and non-European regions, but also Europe, including eastern European countries;
- In the area of cyber threats, include, in addition to cyber attacks, also the threat of information operations (in the Long Term Perspective it is reflected only in the trend of increased globalisation through the "abuse of media for the purposes of information wars"). These operations have the form, in particular, of misinformation, fake news and propaganda and can also target the armed forces and defence policies or influence public opinion or political decision making in defence matters;
- Highlight the complexity and interconnectedness of these threats (e.g., migration is a complex of security, economic, environmental and other factors);
- Consider the opportunities for ensuring defence and developing the capacities of the armed forces (international cooperation, technologies, etc.).

Such defined security environment has to be correlated with the implications for defence and the armed forces. The section defining the capabilities and factors required due to the nature of the future security environment should newly include also the following:

- strengthening the capacity of individual defence in accordance with Article III of the Washington Treaty for the necessary duration;
- strengthening the capability of strategic communication;
- enhancing resilience and readiness of the whole society for crisis situations.
- Based on the decision on the concept of the Long Term Perspective for Defence 2035 and its position in the hierarchy, new chapters relating to the following factors should be possibly included:
- Following up on the political-military ambitions and evaluation of the security environment, supplement the potential range of tasks of the armed forces;

- Complete a structured report on the military implications with consequences for providing the defence of the state (method of conducting the operations, lethality, multi-dimensional operations, environment for conducting the operations, etc.);
- Include and institutional adaptation taking into account the prospects in the areas of economic management, human resources management, armament and property management. It is a public document and it is important to support its credibility in a transparent, effective, efficient and practical functioning of the defence department.

Conclusion

After more than three years, *The Long Term Perspective for Defence 2030*, approved in mid-2015, can be seen as a valuable document in terms of approaching the trends and forecasts of future security and operating environment. The principal trends provide sufficient picture of the future environment, which is fully in line with the majority of prognostic documents issued at that time. It is not important whether they are focused on the general development of civilisation or on the segments of security and conflicts, economy, politics and geopolitics, demographics, technological development, or environment.

The prepared document of Long Term Perspective for Defence 2035 should especially confirm the trend the Czech Republic has been attempting to apply for several years already, i.e., reflecting the recommendations and the commitments of NATO and the EU (2% GDP and budget structure) in the long term. Along with the increase in defence expenditure, it is necessary to increase also the recruitment for the army; otherwise, the fulfilment of declared ambitions will be endangered. Continue to put greater emphasis on improving the education and training of citizens for the defence of the state and the crises, optimally providing systematic general education of citizens in the field of defence. Last but not least, in terms of supplementing and renewal of equipment it is necessary to answer the question what can and should the Czech industry do for defence - although the topic of relationship between defence and industry is addressed in a separate and specialized document (Strategy of Armaments and Support of the Defence Industry, 2016). Further, address the methods of pursuing the interests of the state, including research, experimental development and innovation controlled from the highest level down, i.e., in accordance with the needs of the state. The preparation of this and similar other documents should also be a process based on the aforementioned methodological approaches and open to possible updates responding to major changes.

It is the only way to guarantee that the new document that has the ambition of defining the framework for filling the political-military ambitions of the Czech Republic will not become yet another redundant strategic document without an effect.

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