"ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT, MODERN DEFENCE": NEW NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT OR POLITICAL DECLARATION?

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RESUME
The aim of this paper is to present an analysis of the new NATO Strategic Concept in comparison to the expectations of the international society with respect to this document. It also provides a formal study of the elements of the strategy itself in order to give an answer to the question whether it meets all requirements of such a document. The research shows that the document lacks the very basic constituents of a strategy, does not introduce many real changes nor confirms the existence of new NATO priorities. Taking our findings into consideration, it seems that the new NATO Strategic Concept should be treated only as a political declaration.

Key words: NATO, Strategic Concept, Strategy, Defence, Summit in Lisbon

The changes that have been taking place for over ten years (since the adoption of the previous NATO strategy in 1999) in the security environment and threat perception made it necessary to redefine the strategic concept of NATO. Previously, it has been focused on broad cooperation with other countries for security and maintenance of world peace (Troyan, Grigoryev, 2004), but events on the international scene in the 21st Century has already left far behind these doctrinal records, which have become inadequate in relation to the real requirements (Nečas, Kelemen, 2009; Yost, 2010).

It seemed that the new strategy should define a hierarchy of tasks to be carried out by NATO and suggest the prioritisation of challenges and threats of non-military nature, which relate to the 21st Century (De Spiegeleire, 2009; Aybet, 2009). Furthermore, it was supposed to specify the scope and direction of the Alliance's transformation in military terms, as well as the reform of its internal structure (Gągor, 2010). The third equally important issue was the question of further enlargement of the Organisation and its relations with third countries (Górka-Winter, Madej, 2010). It was expected that the new strategic concept would determine non-traditional and multidimensional tasks of NATO.

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The work of the NATO Wise Men Group has been crowned by signing of the document entitled *Active Engagement, Modern Defence – Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation* adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon on 19 November, 2010. The following article is an attempt to answer the question whether the new NATO Strategic Concept actually meets the expectations set out above, and if it is a real strategic concept, or rather a political declaration.

It must be emphasised that the very shape of the Concept is rather unusual for a strategic document. It has a volume of only eleven pages, is divided into three basic parts. It includes a brief section on the essential tasks and principles for NATO, analysis of the security environment and its development, and more detailed section on tasks and rules for the Organisation. Thus, after a brief introduction, containing an overall NATO mission and vision of its role in the world (NATO continues to play a unique and critical role as a guarantor of collective security, effectively protecting Member States from emerging threats, acquiring new skills and new partners), a list of basic NATO's tasks is provided, followed by a part on the security environment. The order is all the more surprising that the tasks should arise from the results of the analysis of the security environment and interests of the Organisation. Thus, the identification of challenges and the resulting risks and opportunities should go first, followed by an indication of the main objectives of the Organisation based on identified interests, and only on this basis the task should be determined, not vice versa. Reading the Concept, therefore, leave the impression that the identified threats depend on the previously stated tasks of the Organisation, as if they were tailored to suit them. The content of the document was divided into the following parts:

- Preface;
- Core Tasks and Principles;
- Security Environment;
- Defence and Deterrence;
- Security through Crisis Management;
- Promoting International Security through Cooperation;
- Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation;
- Open Door Policy;
- Partnerships;

- Reform and Transformation;
- An Alliance for the 21st Century.

The introductory part is a preview of what is in the subsequent sections of the document. It confirms the existence of close ties between the NATO countries, and their commitment to defend each other against attacks and emerging threats. It also contains a commitment to crisis and conflict prevention, and post-conflict stabilisation activities, including closer cooperation with international partners – mainly the United Nations and the European Union. The strategy also proposes the possibility of closer cooperation with NATO partners outside the Organisation, including playing a significant role in shaping the operations conducted by NATO. There is also a commitment to seek to create conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, acknowledging at the same time that the Organisation will remain in the possession of such weapons as long as they continue exist in the world. It confirms the maintenance of the "open-door" policy and a commitment to continue the ongoing reforms to achieve effectiveness, efficiency and flexibility.

The first part begins with the repetition of the principal purpose of the Organisation, which is to ensure and protect the freedom and security of its Members by political and military means. To accomplish this overall objective, NATO is supposed to continue to fulfil its three basic tasks:

- collective defence, according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty;
- crisis management;
- cooperative security.

This means, therefore, that the implementation of tasks arising from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty remained the primary aim of the Alliance. In addition, Member States supported the potential preventive measures. NATO will therefore be able to assist in the management of developing crises that can affect the security of the Alliance, before they break out into conflict, using the justification that NATO is the only entity in the international arena having sufficient political and military capacity to confront the full spectrum of threats and crises before, during and after the conflict. Building cooperative security is to rely on cooperation with other organisations and countries, mainly in respect to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. NATO has also maintained the "open door" policy and promotion of international security through building partnerships. The last two points of the first part relate to the need to maintain continuity in the process of reform, modernisation and transformation of the Alliance as well as its strategic documents. All these elements are to be developed and refined in the third part.

The fragment devoted to the analysis of the security environment is reduced in fact to the identification of threats exclusively in the objective area:

- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery;
- international terrorism (most dangerous in the extremist form, with the usage of new technologies);
- instability and conflict beyond the NATO borders (extremism, terrorism and international crime – mainly smuggling weapons, drugs and people);
- cyber terrorism (aimed at public administration, business, economics, transportation and critical infrastructure);
- ecological threats.

The challenges NATO will have to face and which will have an impact on the quality of its operation have also been identified:

- energy dependence;
- technological development, including space technologies (having a significant impact on NATO military planning, particularly on conducting operations).

The third part draws upon introductory part of the document and represents, in fact, more extensive treatment of each element (i.e. the three basic tasks: defence and deterrence, ensuring security by managing crises and promoting international security through cooperation) as well as NATO principles (continuous reform and transformation).

Within the concept of defence and deterrence, the most important is to defend the territory of the Member States against the attacks. Deterrence is to be based on a combination of nuclear and conventional capabilities (Nunn, 2010). It is also stressed that as long as there are nuclear weapons, NATO will possess them. The statement that "the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies" (Point 18 of the document) is indeed interesting. This means not just emphasising the role and strength of nuclear power, but represents also a strong indication of the position the United States as a superpower and the very core of the Alliance (the nuclear potential of Great Britain and France is incomparably smaller in respect to the potential of the United States in this area[1]).

In order to carry out tasks related to defence and deterrence, the Alliance will:

- maintain an adequate level of conventional and nuclear forces;
- have the ability to conduct joint operations and smaller operations (including those conducted within the strategic distance);
- develop and maintain a robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out the obligations arising from collective defence and conduct expeditionary operations, including the use of the NATO Response Force;
- conduct the necessary training, information exchange and contingency planning;
- ensure the widest possible participation of Member States in collective defence planning, especially in the nuclear aspect (command, control and consultation mechanisms);
- develop the capability to defend against ballistic missile attack and seek to cooperate on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;
- develop the capacity to protect against the CBRN[2] weapons and to prevent, detect and defend against cyber-attacks (NATO centralised cyber protection);
- strengthen the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism;
- contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure as well as transit areas;
- provide an appropriate assessment of the impact of new technologies on safety and update knowledge on the new threats;
- maintain the necessary level of defence spending.

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[1] Estimated number of warheads: the United States: 2702, France: 300, Great Britain: 160 (*SIPRI Yearbook*, Stockholm 2009).

[2] CBRN – chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (weapons).

Security through crisis management is to be based on experience gained from operations conducted so far (especially in the Balkans and Afghanistan) and comprehensive approach (political, civilian and military elements) to ensure effectiveness. There is also repeated declaration to carry out preventive operations ("the best way to manage conflict is to prevent them from happening" – Point 22 of the document). For this purpose, enhanced intelligence cooperation within NATO is to be pursued, as well as appropriate, but small civilian capabilities are to be created to respond to crises, with enhanced integrated civilian-military planning in the whole spectrum of crisis management.

Promoting international security through cooperation is to be conducted through:

- arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation;
- "open door" policy (the best solution would be the final integration with the Euro-Atlantic structures of all European countries which express such desire);
- building a network of partnerships with other organisations and states (NATO sees the success of its security policy in building networks of interdependencies and a variety of international links).

Most attention and portion of the document is devoted to this last element, which is quite significant. It contains statements about the necessity of cooperation with the United Nations by conducting various operations in the world, as well as about the strategic partnership with the European Union based on the principle of complementarity and non-duplication. Cooperation with Russia is expected to be a strategic one and based on the observation that "NATO poses no threat to Russia" – Point 33 of the document. Subsequently, there is a statement about the Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (including the development of cooperation with Georgia and Ukraine, facilitation of Western Balkans' integration to NATO and promotion of stability in the Middle East).

Completion of the document is constituted by two principles which are to accompany the functioning of NATO in order to meet the challenges of the 21st Century, namely the constant reform and transformation. They are based on the belief that NATO can control operations anywhere due to the integrated command and control structure, as well as due to the fact that it has at the disposal such forces and capabilities that only few members of the Alliance could afford individually. NATO must also have sufficient financial, military and human resources that should be used effectively, which can be achieved by:

- maximisation of forces' deployment capability;
- ensuring the highest possible consistency in defence planning;
- building capabilities jointly;
- strengthening of common capabilities, standards, structures and financial resources;
- engagement in a continuous process of reforms to simplify the structure, improve work methods and maximise efficiency.

The final part is written in grandiloquent terms, with a sublime culminating point which fits very well the little concrete but nicely sounding entirety of the document. It is impossible not to notice the reminder about the power of the United States, which was emphasised a few times, even if indirectly[3].

Before we proceed to the deliberations on security strategy it is necessary to indicate what strategy is in general, specifically within the realm of economics, because these definitions are a starting point for analysing the substance of the strategy in terms of security:

- a strategy is a complete plan that determines which decisions will be taken in any potential situation (Neuman, Morgenstern, 1944);
- a strategy is a process of determining long-term goals of the organisation and the adoption of policies, as well as the allocation of resources necessary to achieve those goals (Chandler, 1962);
- a strategy is an overarching and integrated plan, outlining the benefits of the company with respect to the expectations and challenges of its environment (Glueck, 1980);
- the concept of a strategy relates to the formulation of the main mission, goals and organisational objectives, policies and programs to achieve them, as well as methods needed for the strategies to be implemented to achieve the objectives (Steiner, Miner, Gray, 1986);
- a strategy is related to planned performance (as defined by the management of the company) in connection with the mission and objectives of the enterprise (Wright, Pringle, Kroll, 1992);

[3] This is best illustrated by Points 18 and 36 of the Concept.

- a well-conceived strategy focuses on four main factors:
  - range of the strategy – markets which the organisation will compete in;
  - distribution of resources – the way the organisation divides its resources between different applications;
  - distinctive competence – the issue which the organisation performs particularly well;
  - synergy – the way in which different fields of business complement and support each other (Griffin , 1996);
- a strategy is a broad program of setting and achieving the goals of the organisation; it is the organisation's response in time to environment's impact (Stoner, Freeman, Gilbert, 1997).

Many of these elements are combined in the definition, according to which the strategy refers to the concept of a compound action (action plan) consisting of formulating long-term business objectives and their modifications according to changes in its environment, the selection of resources and means needed to achieve these objectives and practices (ensuring their optimal use) and to respond flexibly to the challenges of the market (guaranteeing the company's favourable conditions of existence, development and economic growth) (Grudzewski, Hajduk, 2001).

Connecting the crucial of the elements of the above-mentioned definitions it is possible to draw a conclusion that a strategy is a way to achieve long-term goals set on the basis of a pre-defined mission in a given time and scope, applying a specific method and action plans using available resources and taking into account the impact of external factors. For the purposes of this article, such definition was adopted as a starting point for further deliberations on the strategy.

It is also important to highlight solid elements of a strategy:

- area of action (which is directly related to the definition of the mission);
- strategic advantage (strength, attractiveness);
- objectives to be achieved;
- functional agendas (action plans); (Koźmiński, Piotrkowski, 2000).

Performing a logical analysis of the functions of these elements it can be stated that the objectives are resulting from the area of operation, i.e. the vision and mission and identification of the strategic advantage (an attractive element). Action plans are in turn defining specific practical ways or methods of achieving goals.

The basic features of a strategy should also reflect:

- time horizon;
- focus of all efforts on a given task to achieve the objectives;
- set of consistent decisions;
- ubiquity – impact in different spheres simultaneously (a broad spectrum of activities and types of targets);
- possibility to be assessed by specific indicators;
- consideration of potential dissimulators (threats).

At this stage, it is important to consider strategy within the military, more broadly, security aspects. Basic, classic examples of defining the concept of strategy in these areas are as follows:

- a strategy concerns the creation of a of war plan, identification of various military campaigns and individual projects within them (Clausewitz, 1976);
- a strategy is the art of dialectic of forces, or more specifically the art of dialectic of will of applying force to resolve the conflict (Beaufre, 1968);
- a strategy is a conscious use of force for political purposes (Gray, 1999).

In the common understanding, strategy is the science of using violent methods to achieve broad political interests – examines the available military forces and resources, and develops concepts that describe their use. Thus, security strategy includes the creation, development, preparation and use of states' potential in this field in order to counter any threats (Balcerowicz, 2002). It can be concluded that security strategy is defined in order to defend against threats on the one hand and to create the best conditions for the development and wide-ranging benefits for the country (region, organisation – depending on the subject defined) on the other. The most important elements of the strategy from a structural point of view are its purpose (final effect) and time horizon.

According to the military perception, until the collapse of the bipolar division of the world, strategic actions included any actions and behaviours of the armed forces during the war. In this sense, formulating a strategy aimed at preventing war and preparing for conducting it. States that are still threatened by armed conflicts and do not adhere to the principles of multilateralism continue to perceive strategy in this way. However, the Western hemisphere countries have started establishing other standards, which have much in common with the concept of strategy in terms of economics. They began to understand that it is actually the same concept or even a tool, being only differently targeted in other type of environment; therefore, it is governed by different rules. It is probably more complex, as it comprises many more elements (spheres) which require analysis.

Strategy refers to the projection and implementation of a coordinated plan to achieve stated objectives. It combines the objectives with methods of achieving them during the time of peace and war (Dupuy, 1993). The national security strategy can be defined as a coordinated national plan to use all instruments of state power – civilian and military – in order to achieve the objectives in the field of defence and accomplish national interests. It concerns the relationships between the final (expected) state and the resources, power and the objectives, capabilities and intentions, and in particular it focuses on the application of available resources to achieve the expected results (Dupuy). The success largely depends on the ability to influence the behaviour of foreign governments and whether they are allies, neutral and uncommitted or hostile, and the action in extreme conditions – from friendship to hostility leading up to war (Dupuy).

Trying to identify the most important elements of strategy in terms of security studies one should concentrate on the following aspects:

- general program of definition and implementation of plans and intentions of a respective state;
- state's system of reaction to its surroundings, i.e. the actual action of the state;
- definition of a state's role and place in the international community;
- definition of a state's mission (i.e. distinguishing element in the international arena, identifying its uniqueness);
- formulation of tasks necessary to achieve the objectives.

Depending on the definition's aims and the field of application, strategy can refer to:

- the purpose and the use of force for political reasons;
- the level of objectives determination and the manner in which the organisation functions;

- the level of objectives determination and the manner of complex action implementation (Rutkowski, 2002).

In case of security policy, the latter definition seems best. In a more general, schematic illustration, strategy is a way to reach the final objective(s) in the relatively shortest possible time. This means achieving the specific partial objectives including internal and external positive and negative factors, i.e. incentives and disincentives enabling achievement of specific goals.

Before approach the issue of security strategies projection, it is therefore necessary to first analyse the security environment (its conditions) and identify state's (organisation's, etc.) (strategic) interests – in the objective area (political, economic interests, etc.) and in the subjective one (countries, regions, areas, etc.). After having analysed the results of the mutual interpenetration of the environmental conditions of security and state's interests, it is possible to define the strategic objectives, which in turn consist of sub-sets of goals (political, economic, military, social, technological, etc.). Identification of the objectives should be accompanied by the consideration of the existing state's mission and vision (i.e. an ideal situation the state is, at least theoretically, looking forward to). The next step, which is extremely important from the point of view of efficiency and effectiveness of the strategy, is to identify possible disincentives, i.e. those factors that can prevent or slow down the implementation of specific objectives, and ultimately – also the strategic goal. The last stage is to develop a method to be used to achieve the objective. This does not mean designing an action plan, as this is a secondary phase, which occurs after developing a strategy. In this phase, there is only a need to identify tools and methods for their use. The above-described process is presented schematically in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Strategy projection schema



Summing up, given that strategy, in a significant simplification, is the aspiration to obtain specific objectives in the shortest time, it seems important to identify the most favourable conditions for its fulfilment. This in turn requires a careful analysis of the security environment that will allow for the identification of existing international trends and challenges, threats and opportunities. It is imperative during the security strategy projection, as one should concentrate on potential opportunities, rather than focusing solely on the threats. In such circumstances, the strategy takes into account the full spectrum of state's (entity's) activity. Inclusion of potential opportunities is therefore a part of projection mechanisms (in contrast to the prognosis), since it contains an element of what the entity aspires to, what is desirable.

Trying to make a full assessment of the analysed Concept, a reference to the characteristics of a strategic document in the theoretical aspect has to be made, in order to identify the basic elements of a strategy (Koźmiński, Piotrowski, 2000) and to analyse their reflections (or notice their absence) in the given Concept:

- area of operation (which is directly related to the definition of the mission): very generally identified NATO's mission causes some difficulty in the projection of political and strategic objectives (which are completely missing in the concept);
- strategic advantage (strength and attractiveness): repeatedly emphasised uniqueness and strength of the Alliance (e.g. "NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises", and "Unique in history, NATO is a security Alliance that fields military forces able to operate together in any environment; that can control operations anywhere" –Points 4 and 36, respectively, of the document);
- objectives to be achieved: aims, as such, have not been clearly defined or rather extracted, they can be presumed while reading between the lines. Unspecified and vague politico-strategic objectives that do not constitute a coherent system, can cause difficulty in identifying specific tasks, developing action plans as well as employing the available tools;
- functional action plans: this element is actually missing in the strategy; only the basic premises for action have been pointed out.

To sum up, the new strategic concept addresses the mission and tasks for the Alliance, but without any identified political and strategic goals, or specific guidelines for action.

To make the analysis more detailed, we now turn to considere whether the new NATO Strategic Concept contains specific elements of the strategy in terms of requirements stated in the security studies' theory:

- a general program for defining and implementing plans and intentions: only in a rudimentary form on a very general level;
- reaction to the circumstances set in a given time: practically absent;
- definition of the role in the international community: on a general level;
- identification of the mission (distinguishing element in the international arena, identifying the uniqueness): on a very general level;
- formulation of tasks that have to be fulfilled to achieve the objectives: the tasks are generally stated, but there are no set objectives (goals).

The above analysis shows that the document is, in fact, not a real strategy. Analysing the problem from another dimension, in a strategic document, at minimum, following elements should be explicitly stated (Balcerowicz, 2004):

- assessment of the security environment – analysis of threats;
- interests, objectives (goals);
- resources involved;
- roles and responsibilities for given sub-institutions;
- basic methods and courses of action.

It is difficult to determine whether the new Strategic Concept was based on a complete analysis of the security environment. It identifies the main objective threats to security in the politico-military sphere, but disregards the social sphere (while such risks may also generate conflicts of a political nature, and even ones requiring military intervention). The strategy avoids identification of threats included in the classification of the sources of threats. The document practically does not take into account the interests of the Alliance or its objectives, which if are at all stated in the document, are not treated separately. The Concept, however, does contain tasks for NATO formulated in a very detailed manner, but with no specific recognition of the forces and resources involved (for instance – there are still no rules of forces deployment for NATO expeditionary operations). There is a lack of any time projection for the tasks set, which means that they are somehow "universal".

As it was stated earlier, based on the observation of the work of the NATO Wise Men Group the Concept includes elements concerning "new opportunities" of deterrence (a combination of conventional and nuclear capabilities), which in really is not a novelty, as in practice it has been used for many years. The strategy does not include any details about this area either, stating that it should be "an appropriate mix" of the capabilities, which in fact does not deliver any details. The new Strategic Concept still preserves a significant distinction between collective defence of NATO territory (resulting from the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty) and expeditionary operations (understood as those which are conducted outside the territory of the Member States, including a considerable distance from them, within the broad crises management operations). Although the relationship between the crises, even in remote locations in the world and the security of NATO countries is stressed out, the distinction and separateness between the performance of tasks arising from

Article 5 and these outside of it is still maintained (there is still no link between them).

It is stressed that NATO needs flexible, mobile and deployable armed forces (expeditionary forces), as well as effective missile defence (the document states the necessity of cooperation with Russia on this issue, but there are no indications that such system is to be built at some particular time).

In addition to determining the need for training and exercises, the Concept does not establish mandatory exercises of NATO forces. Combating terrorism is closely related to the cyber security (another area of NATO's interest), where new methods and measures are to be applied (construction of a NATO centralised cyber protection – also in this case the document does not provide any specifics – sources involved or the establishment of the time frame, or even the most general principles of operation).

Taking into consideration NATO's two main tasks, namely the collective defence and crisis management, a new concept introduces practically no changes. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty applies to collective defence – Members of the Alliance are to help a threatened country in accordance with their capabilities, but are not required to do so in a concrete manner or in a given time frame. The new concept, as well as the previous ones, does not make this record more precise. The current cooperation of the Allies may be illustrated by the conducted peacekeeping, peace enforcement or humanitarian operations. To give an example, in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan (Farrell, Rynning, 2010) a considerable diversity of individual NATO countries involvement in resolving the crisis can be observed. Only good will or desire to be visible at the international arena is to be reckoned with as decisive factors when it comes to the size of the national military contingents participating in the NATO operations. However, taking into account the very hypothetical situation of war of a NATO Member State with another country, it is worth considering the role NATO would play in such situation – whether it is going to be only theoretical deterrence, or real political and military assistance. The new Strategic Concept was to provide answers to these questions, namely develop procedures and tools (the whole mechanism) of genuine and immediate assistance to a threatened NATO Member State, which was to provide a sense of security to the citizens of the NATO countries and to increase the credibility of the Alliance. Unfortunately, this very important issue was not reflected in the new concept, and according to the previous arrangements, the threatened country is guaranteed assistance only with particular forces; moreover, it does not necessarily have to be immediate. The same is true when deciding about the participation in NATO operations. If the Alliance decides on the deployment, the Member States are not obliged to participate or support the operation. It may therefore happen that a country will never decide to participate in a NATO operation.

Apart from the external affairs, the internal affairs of the Alliance are equally important. There is a need for closer cooperation between respective Member States in order to achieve a higher level of capabilities development and more efficient use of all resources, including the financial ones, to conduct operations outside the NATO territory (especially strategic transport). The NATO enlargement and intensification of consultations on political and strategic level along with bureaucracy reduction as well as enhancement of intelligence information exchange system constitute key elements of creating a new quality of NATO. In addition, the consolidation of European states is a condition *sine qua non* improving the level of global security. The new Strategic Concept to a greater or lesser extent takes the above-mentioned statements into account, but does not propose any specific mechanism to implement them. It maintains the "open door" policy and highlights the need to introduce a new quality in relations with Russia (the real strategic partnership between NATO and Russia – Antonenko, Yurgens, 2010). The emphasis is also put on the cooperation with the EU so that these two organisations play complementary rather than competing roles, but there is no further guidance in this field.

The new Strategic Concept did not extend the general character of the organisation either, which remained of political and military character. Apparently, it seems that the new strategy sets the NATO course of action as cooperation with other organisations – mainly the United Nations and the EU. However, the "detailed" provisions might suggest that it will be primarily co-operation in the field of consultation and exchange of experiences, not real joint activities[4].

Summing up, quite significant (in proportion to the whole document) emphasis put on cooperation with other countries and organisations, in particular with Russia, is, in a sense, a novelty. The new Strategic Concept, however, failed to outline NATO's future character; it did not give an unambiguous answer to the question whether it should continue as a transatlantic organisation or to evolve into a global one, neither did it indicate

[4] It is best illustrated by Points 31 and 32 of the Concept.

new priorities. In comparison to the Strategic Concept of the 1999, there has been no significant change in respect to the tasks to be implemented by NATO or even a noteworthy re-evaluation of the distribution of their focal points. There is a noticeable emphasis on arms control and non-proliferation as well as on the relations with Russia. A proposition concerning the construction of a missile defence system, NATO-centralised cyber protection and civilian crisis management capability is a kind of novelty, but lacks any clarifications. Enhanced intelligence cooperation (i.e. sharing of intelligence information among NATO Member States) will primarily serve the interests of the United States, which have the potential and capacity to make use of it. Provisions of the Strategic Concept fully sanction preventive measures – an issue of highest concern for the United States, but not a part of a strategic culture of many European countries.

The authors of the documents treated challenges and threats in the same way – without distinction or even indication which category they are referring to, or the observation that the challenges may generate not only threats but also opportunities, which are not mentioned at all. Nevertheless, it may not be surprising; such analysis is required for projection of the objectives (goals), which, however, are not taken into account in the Concept. Provisions of the new Strategic Concept are rather a well-written political declaration than a strategic document, as they are primarily supposed to sound good, contain little detail and not be binding for Member States (not imposing any specific obligations). Lacking identification of interests and projection of NATO objectives, as well as in fact unchanged catalogue of its tasks may indicate a consensus deficit between the Member States regarding the real direction of the Alliance's transformation. The previous Strategic Concept of 1999 was criticised for its laconic character (Carpenter, 2000); the present one, however, is far worse in every respect. It can be concluded that, despite the introduction of a few new elements, the Strategic Concept of 2010 does not bring about any real historical breakthrough in the process of NATO transformation.

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